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Optimal local and remote controllers with unreliable
uplink channels: An elementary proof
Mohammad Afshari, Student Member, IEEE, and Aditya Mahajan, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Recently, a model of a decentralized control system
with local and remote controllers connected over unreliable
channels was presented in [1]. The model has a non-classical
information structure that is not partially nested. Nonetheless,
it is shown in [1] that the optimal control strategies are linear
functions of the state estimate (which is a non-linear function of
the observations). Their proof is based on a fairly sophisticated
dynamic programming argument. In this note, we present an
alternative and elementary proof of the result which uses common
information based conditional independence and completion of
squares.
Index Terms—Linear systems, certainty equivalence, separa-
tion of estimation and control, common information approach,
networked control systems
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent paper, a methodology for synthesizing optimal
control laws for local and remote controllers for networked
control of a linear system over unreliable uplink channel
was presented [1]. Such models arise in applications such
as temperature control in smart buildings, control of UAVs,
vehicle to infrastructure communication, etc.
The model proposed in [1] is a decentralized control system
with non-classical information structure. Due to the unreliable
nature of the uplink channels, the information structure is
not partially nested. Therefore, one cannot a priori restrict
attention to linear strategies. Nonetheless, it is shown in [1]
that the optimal local and remote control laws are linear
functions of the state estimate (which is a non-linear function
of the observations). See Theorem 1 for a precise statement
of the result.
The proof technique employed in [1] uses ideas from the
common information approach of [2] to compute the optimal
control laws. Using a conditional independence argument, it
is first shown that the local controllers can ignore the past re-
alization of their local states without any loss of optimality [1,
Lemma 1]. When attention is restricted to control strategies
with such a structure the resulting information structure is
partial history sharing [2]. So, in principle, the common
information approach of [2] is applicable. However, there are
several technical difficulties in extending the argument given
in [2] for finite valued random variables to continuous random
variables. The key result of [1] is to carefully resolve these
technical difficulties—issues of measurability, existence of
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well defined value function, and infinite dimensional strategy
space—and then obtain a closed form solution of the dynamic
program.
In this technical note, we provide an alternative and ele-
mentary proof of the result of [1]. Our proof also relies on the
split of total information into common and local information
as proposed in [2]. However, instead of using the dynamic
program proposed in [2], we develop an alternative solution
methodology which relies on (i) the conditional independence
of the local states given the common information (which was
established in [1]); and (ii) simplifying the per-step cost based
on this conditional independence, orthogonality principle, and
completion of squares. The key advantage of this solution ap-
proach is that it completely sidesteps the technical difficulties
with measurability and existence of value functions present in
a dynamic programming based approach. Given the paucity
of positive results in optimal control of decentralized systems,
we believe that a new solution approach is interesting in its
own right.
The model considered in [1] consists of N local controllers
and one remote controller. For ease of exposition, we assume
that N = 2. It will be clear from the proof that the steps
extend to general N . For the most part, we broadly follow the
notation and terminology of [1], but we occasionally deviate
from it to be consistent with the standard notation used in
linear systems.
A. Notations
We use superscripts to indicate subsystems/controllers and
subscripts to indicate time. Thus, xit denotes the state of
subsystem i at time t. The superscript
⊺
denotes transpose (of
a vector or a matrix). 0m×n is am×n matrix with all elements
being equal to zero. We omit the subscript from 0m×n when
the dimension is clear from context. Given column vectors x
and y, the notation vec(x, y) is a short hand for the vector
formed by stacking x on top of y. Given random variables x,
y, and z, the notation x ⊥ y | z indicates that x and y are
conditionally independent given z. Given matrices A and B
with the same number of columns, rows(A,B) denotes the
matrix obtained by stacking A on top of B.
Given matrices A, B, Q, M , R, and P of appropriate
dimensions, we use the following operators:
R(P,A,B,Q,M,R) = Q+A
⊺
PA
− (M +A
⊺
PB)(R+B
⊺
PB)−1(M +A
⊺
PB)
⊺
,
G(P,A,B,M,R) = −(R+B
⊺
PB)−1(M +A
⊺
PB)
⊺
,
2which denote the one step update of the discrete time Riccati
equation and the gain of a linear system, respectively.
II. MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System dynamics
Consider a discrete-time linear dynamical system consisting
of N = 2 subsystems. xit ∈ R
di
x denotes the state of
subsystem i, i ∈ {1, 2}. There is a local controller Ci
co-located with subsystem i. In addition, there is a remote
controller C0. The information available to the controllers will
be described later. Let uit ∈ R
di
u , i ∈ {1, 2}, denote the control
action of local controller Ci and u0t ∈ R
d0
u denote the control
action of remote controller C0.
The initial state xi0 of subsystem i, i ∈ {1, 2}, is random
and the dynamics of subsystem i is given by
xit+1 = A
iixit +
[
Bi0 Bii
] [u0t
uit
]
+ wit, (1)
where wit ∈ R
di
x is the process noise and Aii, Bi0, and Bii are
matrices of appropriate dimensions. We assume that random
variables {w10, . . . , w
1
T−1, w
2
0, . . . , w
2
T−1} are independent and
have zero mean and finite variance. Let xt := vec(x
1
t , x
2
t ),
ut := vec(u
0
t , u
1
t , u
2
t ), and wt := vec(w
1
t , w
2
t ) denote the state,
control actions, and noise of the overall system. Then, the
system dynamics can be written as
xt+1 = Axt +But + wt, (2)
where the matrices A and B are given by
A =
[
A11 0
0 A22
]
and B =
[
B10 B11 0
B20 0 B22
]
.
B. Information structure
At time t, the local controller Ci, i ∈ {1, 2}, perfectly
observes the state xit of subsystem i and sends it to the remote
controller C0 over an unreliable packet drop channel. Let
Γit ∈ {0, 1} denote the state of the channel, where Γ
i
t = 0
means that the channel is in the off state where the transmitted
packet gets dropped while Γit = 1 means that the channel is
in the on state where the transmitted packet gets delivered.
Thus, Γit is a Bernoulli random variable and we denote the
packet drop probability P(Γit = 0) by p
i. We use Γt to denote
(Γ1t ,Γ
2
t ).
Let zit denote the output of the channel i, i ∈ {1, 2}, i.e.,
zit = f(x
i
t,Γ
i
t) =
{
xit, if Γ
i
t = 1
E, if Γit = 0
(3)
where E denotes a dropped packet. It is assumed that there are
perfect channels from C0 to C1 and C2. Using these channels,
C0 can share zt := vec(z
1
t , z
2
t ) and u
0
t−1 with local controllers
C1 and C2. Note that it is possible to recover Γit from z
i
t.
Hence, all controllers also have access to Γt. The fact that
Γt is available at all controllers is critical to derive the main
result of the model (presented in Theorem 1).
Let Hit , i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, denote the information available to
controller Ci to take decisions at time t. Then,
H0t = {z0:t,Γ0:t, u
0
0:t−1}, (4a)
Hit = {x
i
0:t, u
i
0:t−1, z0:t,Γ0:t, u
0
0:t−1}, i ∈ {1, 2}. (4b)
Let Hit be the space of all possible realizations of H
i
t . Then,
controller Ci chooses it’s control action according to
uit = g
i
t(H
i
t), i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, (5)
where the Borel measurable function git : H
i
t → R
di
u is called
the control law of controller Ci at time t. The collection gi =
(gi0, . . . , g
i
T ) is called the control strategy of controller C
i. The
collection g := (g0,g1,g2) is called the strategy profile of the
system.
C. System performance and the optimization problem
The system operates for a finite horizon T . For time t < T ,
the system incurs a per-step cost
ct(xt, ut) =
[
xt
ut
]⊺ [
Qt Mt
M
⊺
t Rt
] [
xt
ut
]
and for the terminal time T , the system incurs a terminal cost
cT (xT ) = x
⊺
TQTxT ,
where Qt, Mt, and Rt are matrices of appropriate dimensions.
We assume the following block-wise structure of Qt, Mt,
and Rt:
Qt =
[
Q11t Q
12
t
Q21t Q
22
t
]
, Mt =
[
M10t M
11
t M
12
t
M20t M
21
t M
22
t
]
,
and
Rt =

R00t R01t R02tR10t R11t R12t
R20t R
21
t R
22
t

 .
The performance of a strategy profile g is given by
J(g) = E
g
[ T−1∑
t=0
ct(xt, ut) + cT (xT )
]
, (6)
where the expectation is with respect to the measure induced
on all the system variables by the choice of strategy profile g.
The following assumptions are imposed on the system:
(A1) The primitive random variables {x10, x
2
0, w
1
0 , . . . ,
w1T−1, w
2
0 , . . . , w
2
T−1,Γ
1
0, . . . ,Γ
1
T−1,Γ
2
0, . . . ,Γ
2
T−1}
are independent.
(A2) The variables {x10, x
2
0, w
1
0 , . . . , w
1
T−1, w
2
0 , . . . , w
2
T−1}
have zero mean and finite variance. We use Σit and
Σix to denote the variance of w
i
t and x
i
0 respectively.
(A3) For each t, the matrix
[
Qt Mt
M
⊺
t
Rt
]
is symmetric and
positive semi-definite, and the matrix Rt is symmet-
ric and positive definite.
We are interested in the following optimization problem.
Problem 1 In the model described above, find a strategy
profile g∗ = (g∗,0,g∗,1,g∗,2) that minimizes (6), i.e.,
J∗ := J(g∗) = inf
g
J(g),
where the infimum is taken over all strategy profiles of the
form (5).
3D. Some remarks
The per-step cost function defined above differs slightly
from the per-step cost function considered in [1] in the
following ways:
• In [1], the matrix
[
Qt Mt
M
⊺
t
Rt
]
was denoted by Rt. We
follow the standard notation here.
• In [1], it was assumed that the performance of a strategy
profile is
E
g
[ T∑
t=0
ct(xt, ut)
]
.
This is effectively the same as assuming that there is
no terminal cost (i.e., QT+1 = 0) and therefore the
terminal control actions uiT are 0 for both local and
remote controllers. To avoid such triviality, we assume
a performance function of the form (6).
III. MAIN RESULT
In this section, we restate the main results of [1] but we
present them in a slightly different manner.
A. Common information based estimates
Following [2], we define the common information Hcomt
between agents as
Hcomt = H
0
t ∩H
1
t ∩H
2
t .
The information structure of the model (4) implies that
Hcomt = H
0
t = {z0:t,Γ0:t, u
0
0:t−1}.
Now we define the common information based “estimates”
of the state and control actions and the corresponding “esti-
mation errors” as follows:
xˆt = E[xt | H
com
t ], x˜t = xt − xˆt, (7)
uˆt = E[ut | H
com
t ], u˜t = ut − uˆt. (8)
For ease of notation, we use xˆit to denote the ith component
of xˆt, i.e., xˆt = vec(xˆ
1
t , xˆ
2
t ). Similar interpretation holds for
x˜it, uˆ
i
t, and u˜
i
t.
It can be shown that the state estimates and the estimation
error satisfy the following property.
Lemma 1 The state estimates and estimation errors evolve as
follows: for i ∈ {1, 2},
xˆi0 =
{
0, if Γi0 = 0
xi0, if Γ
i
0 = 1
and for t > 0,
xˆit+1 =
{
Aiixˆit +B
i0u0t +B
iiuˆit, if Γ
i
t+1 = 0
xit+1, if Γ
i
t+1 = 1.
Therefore,
x˜i0 =
{
xi0, if Γ
i
0 = 0
0, if Γi0 = 1
and for t > 0,
x˜it+1 =
{
Aiix˜it +B
iiu˜it + w
i
t, if Γ
i
t+1 = 0
0, if Γit+1 = 1. ✷
A proof is presented in Sec. IV-D.
Remark 1 Lemma 1 along with the definition of the state and
control estimates (7) and (8) and the information structure (4)
imply that all controllers know the value of vec(xˆ1t , xˆ
2
t ) at
time t. An immediate consequence of this is that controller Ci
knows the value of x˜it at time t. The main result of the model,
explained in the next section, is that the optimal control action
at controller Ci is linear in (xˆt, x˜
i
t). ✷
B. Structure of optimal control laws
In order to present the main result of [1], we recursively
define matrices {Pt}
T
t=1 as follows: PT = QT and for t ∈
{T − 1, . . . , 1},
Pt = R(Pt+1, A,B,Qt,Mt, Rt). (9)
Furthermore, let P iit denote the (i, i)-th block of Pt. Then
for i ∈ {1, 2}, recursively define the matrices {Πit}
T
t=1 and
{P˜ it }
T
t=1 as follows: Π
i
T = Q
ii
T and P˜
i
T = Q
ii
T and for t ∈
{T − 1, . . . , 1}, let
P˜ it = R(Π
i
t+1, A
ii, Bii, Qiit ,M
ii
t , R
ii
t ). (10)
and
Πit+1 = (1− p
i)P iit+1 + p
iP˜ it+1. (11)
The main result of [1] is the following.
Theorem 1 The optimal control strategy for Problem 1 is
given by 
u0tuˆ1t
uˆ2t

 = −Ktxˆt (12)
and
u˜it = −K˜
i
t x˜
i
t, i ∈ {1, 2}, (13)
where the time evolution of xˆt and x˜t are given by Lemma 1.
The gains {Kt}
T−1
t=0 and {K˜t}
T−1
t=0 are given by
Kt = G(Pt+1, A,B,Mt, Rt),
K˜it = G(Π
i
t+1, A
ii, Bii,M iit , R
ii
t ), i ∈ {1, 2},
where the matrices {Pt}
T
t=1, {Π
i
t}
T
t=1, and {P˜
i}Tt=1 are given
by (9), (10), and (11). ✷
Remark 2 Let Kt = rows(K
0
t ,K
1
t ,K
2
t ). Then, Theorem 1
implies that the optimal control actions are given by
u0t = −K
0
t xˆt, (14)
uit = −K
i
t xˆt + K˜
i
t(x
i
t − xˆ
i
t), i ∈ {1, 2}. (15)
Such a control law is feasible because, x˜it is available at
controller Ci as explained in Remark 1.
The structure of the control laws (14)-(15) implies that the
optimal action is a linear function of the state estimate xˆt. Note
that the evolution of the state estimate, given by Lemma 1, is
a non-linear function of the data available at controller Ci,
i ∈ {1, 2}. ✷
Remark 3 Note that the result does not depend on the dis-
tribution of the noise processes {wit}t≥0, i ∈ {1, 2}, as long
4as the random variables {w10, . . . , w
1
T−1, w
2
0, . . . , w
2
T−1} are
independent and have finite second moment. For convenience
we have presented the result under the additional assumption
that the noise is zero-mean but that assumption can be relaxed
using a simple change of variables. ✷
IV. PROOF OF THE MAIN RESULT
A. Roadmap of the proof
Our proof is based on the following fact which is typically
referred to as completion of squares in the literature.
Fact Given a linear system xt+1 = Axt + But + wt, the
quadratic cost
T−1∑
t=0
[x
⊺
tQtxt + u
⊺
tRtut] + x
⊺
TQTxT
may be rewritten as
x
⊺
0P0x0 +
T−1∑
t=0
(ut + Ltxt)
⊺
∆t(ut + Ltxt) +
T−1∑
t=0
w
⊺
t Pt+1wt,
where PT = QT and for t ∈ {T − 1, . . . , 0}, Pt =
R(Pt+1, A,B,Qt,0, Rt), Lt = G(Pt+1, A,B,0, Rt), and
∆t = (Rt +B
⊺
Pt+1B).
Using this fact, one can prove the structure of optimal
strategy for the centralized control of stochastic linear systems
for both complete and partial state observation. See, for
example, [3, Chapter 8]. However, the completion of squares
argument does not work directly for decentralized control
systems.
In our proof, we exploit a fundamental property of the
model, which was established in [1, Claim 2] and is formally
stated as Lemma 2 below: x1t ⊥ x
2
t |H
com
t . As a conse-
quence of this conditional independence, the past realizations
(xi0:t−1, u
i
0:t−1) are irrelevant at controller C
i and may be
shed without loss of optimality. This follows from Blackwell’s
principle of irrelevant information [4] as generalized to decen-
tralized control systems in [5]. The simplified structure of the
optimal controller was established in [1, Lemma 1] and is
formally stated as Lemma 3 below.
Using these two results and basic properties of conditional
expectations, we prove the structure of the dynamics of the
state estimates and the estimation error (Lemma 1). This
structure was also established in [1, Theorem 3] as part of the
result that establishes the structure of the optimal controller.
However, as we show below, one only needs the conditional
independence property of Lemma 2 and its consequences to
establish Lemma 1.
As a next step, we use orthogonal projection and the specific
form of the information structure to simplify the per-step cost
(Lemma 5). We combine this simplified form of the cost
with the dynamics of the state estimates and estimation error
(established in Lemma 1) to prove completion of squares result
for the cost (Theorem 2) tailored to the specific model of the
system.
Subsequently, we follow the standard steps of the “com-
pletion of squares” argument to establish the structure of the
optimal strategy.
B. Conditional independence of local states and its implica-
tions
A key property of the model established in [1, Claim 2] is
the following.
Lemma 2 For any control strategy profile g of the form (5),
x1t ⊥ x
2
t | H
com
t . ✷
Furthermore, it is shown in [1, Lemma 1] that the above
conditional independence implies the following.
Lemma 3 In Problem 1, there is no loss of optimality to
restrict attention to local controllers of the form
uit = g
i
t(x
i
t, H
com
t ), i ∈ {1, 2}. (16)
✷
An immediate consequence of the above lemma is the
following.
Corollary 1 For any control strategy profile g of the
form (16), we have the following:
1) (x1t , u
1
t ) ⊥ (x
2
t , u
2
t ) | H
com
t .
2) (x˜1t , u˜
1
t ) ⊥ (x˜
2
t , u˜
2
t ) | H
com
t . ✷
PROOF Property 1 follows from the Lemma 2 and the struc-
ture of the control strategy. Property 2 follows from Property
1, Eqs. (7) and (8) and the fact that xˆit and uˆ
i
t are functions
of Hcomt . 
C. Some preliminary properties
Lemma 4 For any control strategy profile g of the form (5),
we have the following:
(H1) uˆ0t = u
0
t and u˜
0
t = 0. Thus, uˆt = vec(u
0
t , uˆ
1
t , uˆ
2
t )
and u˜t = vec(0, u˜
1
t , u˜
2
t ).
(H2) E[x˜t | H
com
t ] = 0 and E[u˜t | H
com
t ] = 0.
(H3) For any matrix W of appropriate dimensions,
E[sˆ⊺tWs˜t] = 0, where sˆt = vec(xˆt, uˆt) and s˜t =
vec(x˜t, u˜t).
Furthermore, if the strategy profile is of the form (16), we
have:
(H4) For any matrix W of appropriate dimensions,
E[(s˜1t )
⊺
Ws˜2t ] = 0, where s˜
i
t = vec(x˜
i
t, u˜
i
t). ✷
PROOF Property (H1) follows from the fact that u0t is a
measurable function of H0t (which is the same as H
com
t ).
Property (H2) is a standard property of error estimates and
can be shown as follows:
E[x˜t | H
com
t ] = E[xt − E[xt | H
com
t ] | H
com
t ] = 0.
Property (H3) follows from the generalized orthogonal
principle and can be shown as follows:
E[sˆ
⊺
tWs˜t] = E
[
E[sˆ
⊺
tWs˜t | H
com
t ]
]
= E
[
sˆ
⊺
tW E[s˜t | H
com
t ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 (by (H2))
]
.
Property (H4) follows from Corollary 1 and (H2). 
5D. Proof of Lemma 1
By definition, Hcomt+1 = H
com
t ∪{z
1
t+1, z
2
t+1,Γ
1
t+1,Γ
2
t+1, u
0
t}.
Thus,
xˆit+1 = E[x
i
t+1 | H
com
t+1 ]
= E[xit+1 | H
com
t , z
1
t+1, z
2
t+1,Γ
1
t+1,Γ
2
t+1, u
0
t ]
= E[xit+1 | H
com
t , z
i
t+1,Γ
i
t+1] (17)
where we can remove z−it+1 (where −i means the controller
other than i), Γ−it+1, and u
0
t due to the following reasons:
• By (3), z−it+1 = f(x
−i
t+1,Γ
−i
t+1) and hence conditionally
independent of xit+1 given H
com
t due to (A1), Lemma 2
and Lemma 3.
• Γ−it+1 is conditionally independent of x
i
t+1 given
{Hcomt , u
0
t} due to (1) and (A1).
• u0t = g
0
t (H
0
t ) and hence may be removed from the
conditioning (since Hcomt = H
0
t ).
Now, we consider the two cases Γit+1 = 0 and Γ
i
t+1 = 1
separately. When Γit+1 = 0, z
i
t+1 = E and from (17) we have
xˆit+1 = E[x
i
t+1 | H
com
t , z
i
t+1 = E,Γ
i
t+1 = 0]
(a)
= E[xit+1 | H
com
t ]
(b)
= Aiixˆit +B
i0u0t +B
iiuˆit,
where (a) follows from (A1) and (b) follows from (1), (7),
(8), (H1), (A1), and (A2). Consequently,
x˜it+1 = x
i
t+1 − xˆ
i
t+1 = A
iix˜it +B
iiu˜it + w
i
t.
Now consider the case when Γit+1 = 1, i.e., z
i
t+1 = x
i
t+1.
Therefore,
xˆit+1 = E[x
i
t+1 | H
com
t , z
i
t+1 = x
i
t+1,Γ
i
t+1 = 1] = x
i
t+1.
Consequently, x˜it+1 = x
i
t+1 − xˆ
i
t+1 = 0.
E. Orthogonal projection for per-step cost
Lemma 5 For any strategy profile of the form (16), we have
E[x
⊺
tQtxt] = E
[
xˆ
⊺
tQtxˆt +
∑
i∈{1,2}
(x˜it)
⊺
Qiit x˜
i
t
]
, (18)
E[u
⊺
tRtut] = E
[
uˆ
⊺
tRtuˆt +
∑
i∈{1,2}
(u˜it)
⊺
Riit u˜
i
t
]
, (19)
E[x
⊺
tMtut] = E
[
xˆ
⊺
tMtuˆt +
∑
i∈{1,2}
(x˜it)
⊺
M iit u˜
i
t
]
. (20)
Thus, we have that
E
[[
xt
ut
]⊺ [
Qt Mt
M
⊺
t Rt
] [
xt
ut
]]
= E
[[
xˆt
uˆt
]⊺ [
Qt Mt
M
⊺
t Rt
] [
xˆt
uˆt
]]
+
∑
i∈{1,2}
E
[[
x˜it
u˜it
]⊺ [
Qiit M
ii
t
(M iit )
⊺
Riit
] [
x˜it
u˜it
]]
✷
PROOF To show (18), we recall that xt = xˆt + x˜t. Thus,
E[x
⊺
tQtxt] = E[xˆ
⊺
tQtxˆt + x˜
⊺
tQtx˜t + 2xˆ
⊺
tQtx˜t]. (21)
Consider the second term of (21)
E[x˜
⊺
tQtx˜t] =
∑
i∈{1,2}
E[(x˜it)
⊺
Qiit x˜
i
t] + 2E[(x˜
1
t )
⊺
Q12t x˜
2
t ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 (by (H4))
.
(22)
Substituting (22) in (21) and observing that the third term
of (21) is 0 due to (H3), we get (18).
Eqs. (19) and (20) can be proved in a similar manner. 
F. A change of variables
For ease of notation, we define
xˆ
i,OFF
t+1 = A
iixˆit +B
i0u0t +B
iiuˆit, (23)
x˜
i,OFF
t+1 = A
iix˜it +B
iiu˜it + w
i
t. (24)
Thus, we can write
xˆit+1 =
{
xˆ
i,OFF
t+1 , if Γ
i
t+1 = 0
xit+1, if Γ
i
t+1 = 1,
and
x˜it+1 =
{
x˜
i,OFF
t+1 , if Γ
i
t+1 = 0
0, if Γit+1 = 1.
Let xˆOFFt = vec(xˆ
1,OFF
t , xˆ
2,OFF
t ) and x˜
OFF
t = vec(x˜
1,OFF
t , x˜
2,OFF
t ).
It follows that xˆ
i,OFF
t+1 + x˜
i,OFF
t+1 = x
i
t+1 and
xˆOFFt+1 = Axˆt +Buˆt. (25)
Lemma 6 For any strategy profile of the form (5), we have
the following:
(H5) For any matrix W of appropriate dimensions,
E[xˆOFFt Wx˜
OFF
t ] = 0.
Furthermore, if the strategy profile is of the form (16), we
have:
(H6) For any matrix W of appropriate dimensions,
E[(x˜1,OFFt )
⊺
Wx˜
2,OFF
t ] = 0. ✷
PROOF Property (H5) follows immediately from (H3). Prop-
erty (H6) follows immediately from (H4) and (A1). 
Lemma 7 For any strategy profile of the form (16), we have
the following:
E
[
xˆ
⊺
t+1Pt+1xˆt+1 +
∑
i∈{1,2}
(x˜it+1)
⊺
P˜ it+1x˜
i
t+1
]
= E
[
(xˆOFFt+1)
⊺
Pt+1xˆ
OFF
t+1 +
∑
i∈{1,2}
(x˜i,OFFt+1 )
⊺
Πit+1x˜
i,OFF
t+1
]
. (26)
✷
PROOF We compute the conditional value of the left hand
side given the realization of Γt+1 = (Γ
1
t+1,Γ
2
t+1) and using
Lemma 1. We have four cases
1) Γt+1 = (0, 0): In this case xˆt+1 = xˆ
OFF
t+1 and x˜t+1 =
x˜OFFt+1. Thus,
E
[
xˆ
⊺
t+1Pt+1xˆt+1 +
∑
i∈{1,2}
(x˜it+1)
⊺
P˜ it+1x˜
i
t+1
∣∣∣Γt+1 = (0, 0)]
= E
[
(xˆOFFt+1)
⊺
Pt+1xˆ
OFF
t+1 +
∑
i∈{1,2}
(x˜i,OFFt+1 )
⊺
P˜ it+1x˜
i,OFF
t+1
]
.
62) Γt+1 = (1, 0): In this case xˆt+1 = vec(x
1
t+1, xˆ
2,OFF
t+1 ) =
xˆOFFt+1 + vec(x˜
1,OFF
t+1 ,0) and x˜t+1 = vec(0, x˜
2,OFF
t+1 ). Thus,
E
[
xˆ
⊺
t+1Pt+1xˆt+1 +
∑
i∈{1,2}
(x˜it+1)
⊺
P˜ it+1x˜
i
t+1
∣∣∣Γt+1 = (1, 0)]
= E
[
(xˆOFFt+1)
⊺
Pt+1xˆ
OFF
t+1 + (x˜
1,OFF
t+1 )
⊺
P 11t+1x˜
1,OFF
t+1
+ (x˜2,OFFt+1 )
⊺
P˜ 2t+1x˜
2,OFF
t+1
]
.
3) Γt+1 = (0, 1): Similar to case 2), we can show that
E
[
xˆ
⊺
t+1Pt+1xˆt+1 +
∑
i∈{1,2}
(x˜it+1)
⊺
P˜ it+1x˜
i
t+1
∣∣∣Γt+1 = (0, 1)]
= E
[
(xˆOFFt+1)
⊺
Pt+1xˆ
OFF
t+1 + (x˜
1,OFF
t+1 )
⊺
P˜ 1t+1x˜
1,OFF
t+1
+ (x˜2,OFFt+1 )
⊺
P 22t+1x˜
2,OFF
t+1
]
.
4) Γt+1 = (1, 1): In this case, xˆt+1 = xt+1 = xˆ
OFF
t+1+ x˜
OFF
t+1
and x˜t+1 = 0. Thus,
E
[
xˆ
⊺
t+1Pt+1xˆt+1 +
∑
i∈{1,2}
(x˜it+1)
⊺
P˜ it+1x˜
i
t+1
∣∣∣Γt+1 = (1, 1)]
= E
[
(xˆOFFt+1)
⊺
Pt+1xˆ
OFF
t+1 + (x˜
OFF
t+1)
⊺
Pt+1x˜
OFF
t+1
+ 2(xˆOFFt+1)
⊺
Pt+1x˜
OFF
t+1
]
= E
[
(xˆOFFt+1)
⊺
Pt+1xˆ
OFF
t+1 +
∑
i∈{1,2}
(x˜i,OFFt+1 )
⊺
P iit+1x˜
i,OFF
t+1
]
,
where the last equality follows from (H5) and (H6).
Combining these four cases and using the law of total
probability, we get (26). 
G. Completion of squares
Lemma 8 Let x ∈ Rdx , u ∈ Rdu , and w ∈ Rdx be random
variables defined on a common probability space. Suppose w
is zero mean with finite covariance and independent of (x, u).
Let x+ = Ax + Bu + w, where A and B are matrices of
appropriate dimensions. Then given matrices P , Q, M , and
R of appropriate dimensions,
E
[[
x
u
]⊺ [
Q M
M
⊺
R
] [
x
u
]
+ x
⊺
+Px+
]
= E
[
x
⊺
P+x+ (u+Kx)
⊺
∆(u +Kx) + w
⊺
Pw
]
,
where
∆ = R+B
⊺
PB,
K = ∆−1[M
⊺
+B
⊺
PA],
P+ = Q+A
⊺
PA−K
⊺
∆K. ✷
PROOF Since w is zero mean and independent of (x, u), we
have
E[x
⊺
+Px+] = E
[
(Ax +Bu)
⊺
P (Ax +Bu) + w
⊺
Pw
]
The result follows by expanding both sides and comparing
coefficients. 
By combining Lemmas 5, 7 and 8, we get the following.
Lemma 9 For any strategy profile of the form (16),
E
[
ct(xt, ut) + xˆ
⊺
t+1Pt+1xˆt+1 +
∑
i∈{1,2}
(x˜it+1)
⊺
P˜ it+1x˜
i
t+1
]
= E
[
xˆ
⊺
t Ptxˆt + (uˆt +Ktxˆt)
⊺
∆t(uˆt +Ktxˆt)
+
∑
i∈{1,2}
[
(x˜it)
⊺
P˜ it x˜
i
t + (u˜t + K˜tx˜t)
⊺
∆˜t(u˜t + K˜tx˜t)
+ (wit)
⊺
Π˜it+1w
i
t
]]
. ✷
Theorem 2 For any strategy profile g of the form (16),
J(g) = E
g
[
xˆ
⊺
0Ptxˆ0 +
∑
i∈{1,2}
(x˜i0)
⊺
P˜ i0x˜
i
0
+
T−1∑
s=0
(uˆs +Ksxˆs)
⊺
∆s(uˆs +Ksxˆs)
+
T−1∑
s=0
∑
i∈{1,2}
(u˜is + K˜
i
sx˜
i
s)
⊺
∆˜is(u˜
i
s + K˜
i
sx˜
i
s)
+
T−1∑
s=0
∑
i∈{1,2}
(wis)
⊺
Πit+1w
i
s
]
, (27)
where ∆s = Rs+B
⊺
Ps+1B and ∆˜
i
s = R
ii
s +(B
ii)
⊺
Πis+1B
ii,
i ∈ {1, 2}. ✷
PROOF For any strategy profile g, define the expected cost to
go from time t onwards as
Vt(g) = E
g
[T−1∑
s=t
cs(xs, us) + cT (xT )
]
. (28)
We claim that
Vt(g) = E
g
[
xˆ
⊺
t Ptxˆt +
∑
i∈{1,2}
(x˜it)
⊺
P˜ it x˜
i
t
+
T−1∑
s=t
(uˆs +Ksxˆs)
⊺
∆s(uˆs +Ksxˆs)
+
T−1∑
s=t
∑
i∈{1,2}
(u˜is + K˜
i
sx˜
i
s)
⊺
∆˜is(u˜
i
s + K˜
i
sx˜
i
s)
+
T−1∑
s=t
∑
i∈{1,2}
(wis)
⊺
Πit+1w
i
s
]
. (29)
We prove the claim by backward induction. For t = T ,
Lemma 5 implies that
VT (g) = E
[
xˆ
⊺
TQT xˆT +
∑
i∈{1,2}
(x˜iT )
⊺
QiiT x˜
i
T
]
.
Eq. (29) follows from the definition of PT and P˜
i
T . This forms
the basis of induction. Now assume that (29) is true for t+ 1
and consider Vt. By definition, we have
Vt(g) = E
g
[ct(xt, ut)] + Vt+1(g)
Using the expression for Vt+1 and Lemma 9, we get the
expression for Vt. This completes the induction step and
proves the claim (29).
The result of the Theorem then follows from observing that
J(g) = V0(g). 
7H. Proof of Theorem 1
By Lemma 3, there is no loss of optimality in restricting
attention to control strategy profile of the form (16). By
Theorem 2, the performance of a strategy of the form (16) is
given by (27). Note that the first two and the last terms of (27)
are control free (i.e., they depend on only primitive random
variables). Thus, minimizing J(g) is equivalent to minimizing
J˜(g) = E
g
[T−1∑
s=0
[
(uˆs +Ksxˆs)
⊺
∆s(uˆs +Ksxˆs)
+
∑
i∈{1,2}
(u˜is + K˜
i
sx˜
i
s)
⊺
∆˜is(u˜
i
s + K˜
i
sx˜
i
s)
]]
.
By (A3), Rt is symmetric and positive definite and therefore
so is Riit . It can be shown recursively that Pt and P˜t are
symmetric and positive semi-definite. Hence both ∆t and ∆˜
i
t
are symmetric and positive definite. Therefore, J˜(g) ≥ 0
with equality if and only if the strategy profile g is given
by Theorem 1.
V. DISCUSSION
The model in [1] consisted of N local controllers and one
remote controller. We restricted our discussion to N = 2. All
steps of our proof apart from Lemma 7 extend trivially to the
case of general N . To extend Lemma 7 to the case of general
N , one can establish the following result.
Lemma 10 For the system with general N , for any γ =
(γ1, . . . , γn), γi ∈ {0, 1}, we have
E
[
xˆ
⊺
t+1Pt+1xˆt+1 +
N∑
i=1
(x˜it+1)
⊺
P˜ it+1x˜
i
t+1
∣∣∣ Γt+1 = γ]
= E
[
(xˆOFFt+1)
⊺
Pt+1xˆ
OFF
t+1
+
N∑
i=1
(x˜i,OFFt+1 )
⊺
Λit+1(γ
i)x˜i,OFFt+1
∣∣∣ Γt+1 = γ],
where Λit+1(γ
i) =
{
P˜ it+1, if γ
i = 0
P iit+1 if γ
i = 1.
✷
Lemma 7 then follows from observing that∑
(γ1,...,γN )∈{0,1}N
P(Γ1t = γ
1) · · ·P(ΓNt = γ
N)Λit+1(γ
i)
=
∑
γi∈{0,1}
P(Γit = γ
i)Λit+1(γ
i)
= piP˜ it+1 + (1− p
i)P iit+1
= Πit+1.
The proof of Theorem 2 is similar in spirit to the proof of
centralized linear quadratic control presented in [3]. However,
due to decentralized information and the presence of unreliable
communication channels, the specific details are different. As
far as we are aware, this is the first paper which presents
a methodology to synthesize optimal controllers for dynamic
decentralized control systems without using a dynamic pro-
gramming or a spectral decomposition argument. In contrast
to dynamic programming based approaches, we sidestep the
subtle measurability issues that arise in common information
based dynamic program for continuous state and action spaces.
In contrast to spectral decomposition based arguments, we do
not apriori restrict attention to linear strategies. We believe that
the solution approach presented in this paper is interesting in
its own right and may be applicable to other decentralized
control problems as well.
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